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Existing approaches to formulating IS security strategy rely primarily on the risk management process and the
application of baseline security standards (e.g., ISO 27002, previously ISO 17799). The use of existing approaches
generally leads to measures that emphasize target hardening and incident detection. While such measures are
appropriate and necessary, they do not capitalize on other measures, including those that surface when situational
crime prevention (SCP) is applied to specific crimes. In particular, existing approaches do not typically surface
measures designed to reduce criminal perceptions of the net benefits of the crime, or justification and provocation to
commit the crime. However, the methods prescribed to-date for implementing SCP are cumbersome, requiring
micro-level, individual analysis of crimes. In the current article, we propose that concepts derived from SCP can be
strategically applied at an intermediate (meso) level of aggregation. We show that such meso-level application of
SCP, when combined with the traditional risk management process, can reduce residual information security risk by
identifying new strategies for combating computer crime. Using three illustrative cases, we demonstrate that the
application of the proposed strategic approach does surface meaningful countermeasures not identified by the
traditional risk management process alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information assets in modern organizations are subject to an increasing range of threats and vulnerabilities. These
threats and vulnerabilities are exacerbated by complexities that arise from system interdependencies, organizational
interconnectivity, and ubiquitous digital data storage. Overall, organizations face daunting challenges in their efforts
to safeguard their information assets. As such, organizations need to adopt an information security strategy to guide
countermeasure identification and the optimal allocation of resources to minimize the risks from cyber threats. We
define information security strategy as the pattern or plan that integrates the organization‘s major IS security goals,
policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole, based on Quinn et al.‘s [1988] definition of strategy. We argue
that a strategic approach to information security will help identify effective and cohesive countermeasures to threats
and vulnerabilities, and facilitate efficient implementation of these measures. Further, the strategic approach will
maximize information security, while minimizing costs. The focus of this article is to incorporate situational crime
prevention (SCP) principles into the formulation of information security strategy.
Historically, security strategy has been used as an umbrella term to include security planning models [Straub and
Welke, 1998], management of information security [Choobineh et al., 2007], and policy frameworks for information
security [Rees et al., 2003]. The prevailing strategic approach to information security today is the risk management
approach [Hoffman, 1989; Straub and Welke, 1998; Suh and Han, 2003; Alter and Sherer, 2004; Backhouse and
Bener, 2004]. The generic risk management approach begins with the identification of assets, threats, and
vulnerabilities, followed by risk assessment. Based on the risk assessment, countermeasures are considered and
implemented, often with the assistance of baseline security standards (e.g., ISO 27002, FIPS, and COBIT).
Recommendations for countermeasures usually include (1) target hardening via technical countermeasures, such as
the use of passwords, antivirus software, firewalls, and encryption, (2) ―insider‖ controls, such as policies and rules
(e.g., Eloff and von Solms [2000]; Ma and Person [2005]), and (3) detection and investigative capabilities.
The current risk management approach artificially limits the range of countermeasures used to reduce computer
crime. Traditional risk management and standards based security strategies focus on: (1) increasing the effort
required by the criminal to commit a crime, and (2) increasing the risk of a criminal being identified and
apprehended. Such measures are appropriate and very necessary. However, technical fortification of information
assets is part of an ongoing and possibly never-ending cycle, in which criminals and information security
professionals continually try to outdo the others‘ technologies. Furthermore, some criminals are simply not
dissuaded by heavily fortified targets. Increasing risk to the criminal also has limitations, as hackers are often outside
the jurisdictional reach of the appropriate authorities. In short, a need exists for information security measures
beyond increasing requisite criminal effort and the likelihood of catching the criminal. We contend that organizations
can bolster their information security posture by identifying additional countermeasures that influence offender
decision making and proactively keep them from attempting the crime. In this article, we propose a new methodology
to identify such countermeasures, based on the principles underlying Situational Crime Prevention (SCP).
SCP proceeds on the argument that criminals are rational and engage in crime to benefit themselves [Cornish and
Clarke, 2006]. Based on research over several decades in the domain of non-digital crime, it has been shown that
criminal motivation to engage in a specific crime is influenced by a criminal‘s perception of the following: (1) effort
required to commit the crime, (2) risk of being caught, (3) benefit to the criminal, (4) moral justification of the crime,
and (5) provocations to commit the crime. In the past decade, Willison et al. have proposed extending SCP to the
information security domain [Willison, 2000; Willison, 2006b; Willison, 2006a; Willison and Backhouse, 2006;
Willison and Siponen, 2009]. Because SCP is based on the rational choice perspective of the criminal, the belief is
that using SCP will surface additional, new countermeasures to reduce computer crime by influencing cyber offender
decision-making, rather than solely resurfacing standard countermeasures, such as fortifying targets and detecting
breaches.
A major problem with extending SCP to the digital realm, from an organizational perspective, is that proponents of
SCP emphasize that crime specificity is a key proposition, thereby requiring micro-level analysis [Cornish, 1994;
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of offender-environment interaction yields high-level socio-economic structures that inform lifestyle theory, routine
activities theory, and environmental criminology as explanations for criminal behavior [Clarke, 1995; Willison and
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Backhouse, 2006]. On the other hand, micro-level examination of the offender-environment interaction often results
in a solely procedural view of the crime. This helps illuminate very specific situational manipulations, but the
approach is cumbersome. Micro-level analysis has other shortcomings, as well. First, the procedural view does not
fully explain offender perception of opportunity. Second, it helps identify operational level countermeasures from the
bottom-up, and does not necessarily benefit from an overarching, guiding strategy. Third, the approach is not
necessarily predicated on a theoretically guided process for selecting good candidates for SCP application. As a
result, organizations need a meso-level or intermediate level of analysis—a level that is not too high to manipulate
situational factors effectively, nor so low that similarities between individual crimes are ignored.
In this article, we argue it is possible to relax the requirement of crime specificity and apply SCP at an intermediate
(meso) level of aggregation, which makes SCP useful for formulating IS security strategy. The proposed meso-level
application of SCP aggregates computer crimes according to offender characteristics and motivation. In short,
understanding the criminal perspective by examining their characteristics and motivations permits an organization to
select the appropriate balance of SCP‘s five categories: perceived effort, perceived risk, perceived benefit, perceived
justification, and perceived provocation. This then facilitates the identification of new countermeasures not previously
surfaced through traditional risk management and baseline security standards approaches. The meso-level
application of SCP does not negate, nor prohibit the micro-level application (e.g., the script-theoretic approach), but
it does provide the organization an opportunity to incorporate SCP at the strategic level of information security
planning.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we review related research. Then, we present a
framework to facilitate the use of SCP at an intermediate level of aggregation and describe the modified risk
management approach to formulating IS security strategy. This is followed by three illustrative cases that implement
the approach, show the expanded range of countermeasures, and demonstrate that the expansion does not add
significantly to the complexity of the risk management process. Finally, we conclude with a discussion section which
highlights the contributions and limitations of this research.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
In this section, we review approaches currently used to formulate information security strategy. Again, we define
information security strategy as the pattern or plan that integrates the organization‘s major IS security goals, policies,
and action sequences into a cohesive whole (adapted from Quinn et al., 1988, definition of strategy). The strategy is
the plan that results from a series of strategic, high-level decisions regarding which threats to counter and how to
counter them. Strategy formulation is the process of developing the overall plan. There are two prevailing
approaches to information security formulation: the risk management approach and the baseline security standards
approach. We discuss both in this section. Then, we provide background on the situational crime prevention (SCP)
approach to reducing crime, including a segment on its application to the area of computer crime.

Risk Management and Baseline Security Standards Approaches
There is no singularly accepted definition of the risk management (RM) approach, but in general it ―is the process
that allows IT managers to balance the operational and economic costs of protective measures and achieve gains in
mission capability by protecting the IT systems and data that support their organization‘s missions‖ [Stoneburner et
al., 2002, p. 4]. The fundamental steps in the process of managing risk are shown in Table 1. Some may title the
steps differently, represent them with varying degrees of granularity, or include additional steps, but the general
scope and sequence remains.
The traditional risk management action sequence results in an RM-based information security strategy—a plan of
action involving the implementation and periodic reevaluation of specific countermeasures designed to achieve
information security goals from a risk management point of view. The organization does not presume absolute
information security is attainable, nor does it consider it a desirable goal given the potentially prohibitive cost.
Instead, an organization carefully considers its mission, assets, threats, and vulnerability and subsequently
identifies, assesses (i.e., ranks), and mitigates risks accordingly. The decisions surrounding which risks to mitigate,
to what extent, what types of countermeasures to employ, and at what cost, are strategic in nature. This collective
set of decisions constitutes the strategy. The generic risk management approach does not guide the choice of
specific operational level countermeasures. Professionals often turn to baseline security standards to help identify
such countermeasures.
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Table 1: Traditional Risk Management Process

Steps

Description

1. Asset Identification and Classification

Determine what the organization needs to protect
and to what extent.

2. Threat Identification and Classification

Determine who and what represent risks to those
assets.

3. Vulnerability Identification and Classification

Determine the organization‘s weaknesses and how
they relate to assets from Step 1 and threats from
Step 2.

4. Risk Assessment

Quantitatively or qualitatively determine the risk of
each vulnerability (considering asset value, threat
probability, loss estimates, and vulnerability
exposure).

5. Controls and Countermeasures Identification

Design preventative solutions (i.e. controls) to
mitigate risks to the extent deemed desirable/
acceptable, considering cost (product costs,
implementation costs, and maintenance costs) and
operational impact.

6. Controls and Countermeasures
Implementation

Put controls in place institutionally.

7. Re-evaluation

Continually examine the effectiveness of current
controls and reconsider changes to mission, assets,
threats, and vulnerabilities to identify appropriate
changes.

Baseline security standards are generalized, codified sets of best practices, recommended controls, and practical
guidelines used by organizations, from which they tailor organization specific, operational level information security
policy. The standards may be advisory or compulsory, depending on the issuing and implementing agencies. The
approaches underlying the major baseline standards, such as ISO 27002, FIPS, and COBIT, overlap with the
RM-based approach to a large extent. Risk assessment is the first of twelve domains in ISO 27002. The U.S.
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandates federal systems comply with the Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS), one of which is NIST SP 800-30, ―Risk Management Guide for Information
Technology Systems.‖ ―Assess and Manage IT Risks‖ is a major step in COBIT‘s first of four domains. Clearly, both
the risk management approach and the standards based approach place strong emphasis on managing risk.
However, the baseline security standards approach provides best practices and specific control/countermeasure
recommendations, which the basic RM-based approach typically does not provide.
The controls recommended by baseline security standards yield security measures aimed at prevention and
detection, primarily through technical, formal, and informal controls. Technical controls refer to the technical
measures taken to prevent and detect unauthorized access. Formal controls refer to policies, procedures, and
rules—managerial and organizational conditions—that limit employee activities. Informal controls refer to the
development of ethical culture and to education to raise awareness of security-related issues. The historical
emphasis has been on technical controls [Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; Choobineh et al., 2007]. The prevailing goal
of these controls, perhaps with the exception of informal controls, is to guard the information assets, rather than to
influence offender decision making. Controls have seldom been designed and employed with the particular intention
of influencing offender behavior—to dissuade offenders from making an event decision to commit a specific crime.
Extending SCP to the digital realm is an attempt to do just that.
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Situational Crime Prevention
Background
Situational crime prevention (SCP) involves ―the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment
in as systematic and permanent a way as possible‖ [Clarke, 1997, p. 4] to reduce opportunities to commit a crime.
Opportunity reduction is accomplished by making ―the crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and
excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders‖ [Clarke, 1997, p. 4]. Opportunity is further lessened by reducing
provocations to crime commission [Wortley, 2001; Cornish and Clarke, 2003]. In short, the situational manipulations
are designed to influence the offender‘s perception of the opportunity. When the perceived costs outweigh the
perceived benefits, the situation is not perceived as an opportunity. When the offender does not perceive the crime
as sufficiently excusable, or justifiable, the situation is not perceived as an opportunity. Clarke [1997] compiled a list
of case studies in the physical domain (i.e., non-computer technology related crimes) that lend support to the
situational crime prevention approach.
The theoretical basis of SCP is the rational choice perspective [Clarke, 1997], which is presented in its full or
summarized form in many different publications, including Cornish and Clarke [2006]. The rational choice
perspective assumes that offenders are rational, within the limitations of bounded rationality, and that they act in selfinterest. The basic argument is that offenders, consciously or subconsciously, weigh costs (effort and risk) and
benefits to determine the perceived net benefit associated with committing a crime. Further, offender event decision
making is moderated by criminal perception of justification to commit crime [Clarke and Homel, 1997] and
provocations [Wortley, 2001]. SCP suggests that it is possible to manipulate the environment associated with a
specific crime to influence the criminal‘s (bounded) rational evaluation of the opportunity. Environmental
manipulations alter the criminal‘s perception of the effort involved in committing the crimes, the risk of being caught,
benefits from the crime, the moral inhibition to commit a crime, and/or provocation to commit the crime. (The five
factors will henceforth be referred to as effort, risk, benefit, justification and provocation respectively, in the interest
of brevity.) The current model of SCP classifies twenty-five opportunity reducing techniques along the five factors
just listed [Cornish and Clarke, 2003].
SCP literature emphasizes the notion of crime specificity when implementing its twenty-five opportunity reducing
techniques. Crime specificity is defined by the procedural set of actions and pre/post-conditions necessary for a
unique crime event. Thwarting necessary steps, and/or altering necessary conditions is argued to thwart the crime.
Thus, crime specificity requires that situational manipulations be tailored to specific crimes (e.g., a rash of breaking
into cars parked in poorly lit areas to steal music systems), rather than to broad categories of crime (e.g., burglary)
[Clarke and Homel, 1997; Willison, 2006b].
SCP in the Digital Realm
Researchers have suggested two formal, micro-level methods of implementing SCP in the digital realm: (1) using the
crime-specific opportunity structure [Willison and Backhouse, 2006], and (2) the script-theoretic approach via
universal scripts [Willison, 2006b; Willison and Siponen, 2009]. The crime-specific opportunity structure [Willison and
Backhouse, 2006] is based on Clarke‘s [1995] model of the opportunity structure of crime. In his model, Clarke
integrated several related theories, such as environmental criminology, routine activities theory, lifestyle theory, and
SCP. The integration shows that even though each has a different origin and was developed for a somewhat unique
purpose, the theories are still related and mutually reinforcing. Willison and Backhouse [2006] argued that this
general model can be made more specific by considering a particular crime. They referred to this as the crimespecific opportunity structure, extended it to the digital realm, and conducted a post-hoc analysis of a case in which
a local government employee committed computer input fraud. In the analysis, they mapped the steps taken by the
offender to the concepts of the crime-specific opportunity model and argued that a prospective analysis could have
identified steps that needed to be implemented to prevent such a crime.
The other approach to implementing SCP introduced in past literature is the script-theoretic approach. Cornish
[1994] put forth the idea of using crime scripts to analyze how a specific crime can be prevented. Crime scripts refer
to the sequence of steps that an offender must go through to commit a crime. The use of crime scripts to thwart a
crime relies on thwarting one or more steps required to commit the crime successfully. Ideally, offender input, or
actual crime accounts are used in generating scripts. However, such information is seldom available, so Cornish
[1994] recommends the use of universal scripts. Universal scripts comprise a set of generalized scenes that can be
used to model the steps involved in the commission of a specific crime (e.g., preparation, entry, pre-condition, doing,
post-condition, and exit) [Cornish, 1994]. Again, Willison et al. [2006b; Willison and Siponen, 2009] perform a posthoc analysis of a computer input fraud case to demonstrate how the method could have helped identify
countermeasures to fight that specific instance of computer input fraud. Using their approach, the development of
the script assists the practitioner in operationally identifying the appropriate countermeasures (selecting among
SCP‘s 25 opportunity reducing techniques) to implement to prevent a specific crime.
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There are two concerns with the crime-specific opportunity structure approach, as well as the script-theoretic
approach. First, both require micro-level analyses and strict interpretation of the crime specificity assumption of SCP.
The micro-level analysis requires a focus on implementation at the operational level rather than the strategic level,
which makes it very cumbersome to implement the techniques across the broad spectrum of digital crimes. From an
organizational resource perspective, it would be helpful to identify good cyber crime candidates for SCP before
engaging in micro-level analyses of any or all cyber crimes. Further, the crime specificity assumption requires scripts
to be developed. It is questionable whether such scripts can be reliably developed for all instances of crime to which
SCP may be amenable, particularly those that have not yet occurred in an organization. In the case of computer
crimes, even for crimes that have already occurred, organizations do not always gain a full step-by-step
understanding into how a breach occurred.
The second concern is that both the crime-specific opportunity structure and script-theoretic approaches are focused
on the procedural and environmental aspects of opportunity, rather than on perceptual opportunity (i.e., whether a
crime is ―worth it‖ in the mind of an offender). Neither approach focuses on understanding offenders, their motivation,
and their perception of an opportunity from a rational choice perspective. This understanding is paramount in
determining the utility of applying SCP to specific cyber crimes. The remainder of this article demonstrates how SCP
can be incorporated into the traditional risk management process to identify organization specific risk classes that
are amenable SCP crime reducing techniques, using an offender classification framework.

III. MESO-LEVEL APPLICATION OF SCP TO THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
In this section we present a modified risk management process that integrates SCP at a meso-level to surface
additional, new information security countermeasures designed to influence offender decision making and
proactively deter crime events. We begin by providing and discussing a framework for such classification. Then, we
introduce the modified risk management process, showing exactly where SCP fits into the process and how the
process changes in a reasonable and manageable manner. In the next section, we use three, real-world illustrative
cases to show how the approach is integrated into the risk management process to surface new countermeasures.

The Offender’s Perspective
SCP views criminal acts from the offender‘s perspective, i.e., the offender‘s perception of the current crime
opportunity. Returning to the roots of SCP, there are five theoretical dimensions of the offender‘s perception of a
criminal opportunity—perceived effort, perceived risk, anticipated rewards, rationalization/justification, and
provocations. Much empirical research over the past two decades has demonstrated the sufficiency of these
dimensions in explaining offenders‘ crime event decisions. The dimensions are not strictly orthogonal to each other,
but the overlap is limited. Five techniques have been enumerated within each of the five theoretical dimensions,
resulting in the well-known twenty-five cell table of opportunity reducing SCP techniques (see Table 2). However,
only the columns have dimensional labels. The rows have no common theme or dimensional consistency. So, from
the perspective of theoretical rigor, when applying SCP to crimes, one should consider offender perception in
relation to the theoretically substantiated dimensions (the columns in Table 2), not all twenty-five cells. Once the
influence(s) of criminal perception are identified, then specific situational manipulations (i.e., countermeasures) can
be considered for each of the rows under the applicable columns for that crime.
The key issue is, how does an organization use SCP principles to reduce overall cyber crime risk? Past research
[Willison, 2006b; Willison and Backhouse, 2006; Willison and Siponen, 2009] has taken a procedural view of the
crime to select opportunity reducing techniques from the classic 25-cell SCP table. We contend that while this
approach is a useful decision aid in identifying operational level countermeasures, it is not a theoretically guided
approach for making strategic level decisions to reduce cyber crime risks in an organization. Further, its procedural
bias largely ignores the role offender motivation and individual characteristics play in influencing offender perception
of a criminal opportunity. We argue that the information security strategy should be based on the SCP dimensions
most useful in reducing offender propensity to commit a crime. Assessing offender propensity requires an
understanding of the offender perspective of the crime. Toward this end, we begin by proposing an offender
framework, based on offender characteristics.

Proposed Offender Classification Framework
Our literature review of hacker taxonomies [Landreth, 1985; Hollinger, 1988; Chantler, 1996; Denning, 1998; Parker,
1998; Power, 1998; Rogers, 2006] surfaced four key offender characteristics that are largely independent of each
other, that should influence offenders‘ perception of ―opportunity.‖ These offender characteristics are: offender
motivation, offender skill level, offender-victim relationship, and offender involvement. They are shown in Table 3,
along with their sub-categories. Each dimension is introduced more thoroughly in the following sections. In particular,
we provide arguments to show that the dimension will influence the offender perception of the crime opportunity.
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Table 2: Twenty-Five Opportunity Reducing Techniques of SCP [Cornish and Clarke, 2003]
Increase Effort

Increase Risks

Reduce Rewards

Reduce Provocation

Remove Excuses

1. Target harden

6. Extend
guardianship

11. Conceal targets

16. Reduce frustration
and stress

21. Set rules

2. Control access

7. Assist natural
surveillance

12. Remove targets

17. Avoid disputes

22. Post
instructions

3. Screen exits

8. Reduce anonymity

13. Identify property

18. Reduce emotional
arousal

23. Alert
conscience

4. Deflect
offenders

9. Utilize place
managers

14. Disrupt markets

19. Neutralize peer
pressure

24. Assist
compliance

5. Control tools
and weapons

10. Strengthen
formal
surveillance

15. Deny benefits

20. Discourage
imitation

25. Control drugs
and alcohol

Table 3: Proposed Offender Classification Framework

Dimension

Categories

Offender Mtivation

Play, Crime, Hacktivism, National Security

Offender Skill

High, Medium, Low

Offender-Victim Relationship

Insider, Outsider

Offender Involvement

Anti-social Predator, Mundane, Provoked

Offender Motivation
Most hacker taxonomies use offender motivation as a primary taxonomical dimension. Some researchers create a
more expansive list of hacker categories based on nuanced differences in motivation, while others create hacker
categories that encompass many different motivations. A review of hacker motivation taxonomies suggests that they
can be collapsed into a parsimonious set of four motivations: play, crime, hacktivism, and national security. This
categorization is a slightly modified version of Denning‘s taxonomy (1998). The ―play‖ domain consists of
unauthorized computer activities engaged in for fun and/or intellectual challenge, without malicious intent. The goal
of those operating in the ―crime‖ domain is to commit a specific crime that happens to involve a computer or network
during the commission of that crime. Those operating in the ―hacktivism‖ domain are using technology merely as a
transport mechanism for their activist message. Finally, those operating in the ―national security‖ domain have
transnational goals, i.e. foreign intelligence, war, terrorism, and espionage.
It can be readily seen that offender motivation identified in previous research [Landreth, 1985; Hollinger, 1988;
Chantler, 1996; Denning, 1998; Parker, 1998; Power, 1998; Rogers, 2006] maps to the parsimonious set proposed
(see Table 4). Other classifications of hacker motivations have been published [Mulhall, 1997; Calkins, 2000; EmbarSeddon, 2002], but the categories suggested by these are subsumed by the categories in Table 4.
Criminal motivation has significant influence on the effectiveness of the five SCP countermeasure categories. For
example, highly skilled hackers motivated by ―play‖ are often seeking a challenge. As such, increasing perceived
effort required would not dissuade them from committing a specific crime. In fact, it might even incentivize him. On
the other hand, the external, financial fraud criminal, seeking credit card numbers and personal data in a target-rich
environment may very well be influenced to target a different organization (or no organization at all) if the perceived
effort required to hack an organization is high. For her, time is money, and the end goal is money, not an intellectual
challenge. If offender motivation is crime, then increasing effort by installing firewalls and strong passwords is an
option to consider. Other options, such as reducing justification or reducing provocation may be more useful for the
―play‖ attacker, but would be less useful when offender motivation is crime. Similar comparative examples exist for
the other countermeasure categories.
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Table 4: Classifications of Offender Motivation
Play

Crime

Hacktivism

National Security

Denning
[1998]

Fun; play;
intellectual
challenge

Illegal financial
gain

Ideological gain;
individual rights

Patriotism

Landreth
[1985]

Fun; play;
intellectual
challenge—
learning;
intellectual
challenge—
conquest
notoriety;
peer esteem

Criminal theft

Notoriety

Copyright
violation;
unauthorized
access to
data/information;
damage to data/
information
systems

Unauthorized
access to data/
information;
damage to
data/information
systems

Unauthorized
access to
data/information;
damage to
data/information
systems

Vengeance

Espionage

Hollinger
[1988]

Chantler
[1996]

Peer esteem;
achievement;
self-discovery;
excitement;
challenge

Profit; theft

Power [1998]

Sports intruders

Vandalism;
personal interests;
corporate
interests

Parker* [1998]

Fun; intellectual
challenge

Harm to data/
information
systems; criminal
livelihood

Social justice;
terrorism

Terrorism

Rogers [2006]

Excitement;
peer esteem;
media attention;
Intellectual
challenge;
curiosity

Financial gain

Revenge

Patriotism

National interests

* Parker [1998] has two classifications called ―personal problem solvers‖ and ―malcontents/ addicts/irrational/incompetent
people‖ that do not fit well with any of Denning‘s categories.

Offender Skill Level
While some hacker taxonomies differentiate hackers solely along the ―motivation‖ dimension, others use skill level,
or a combination of both, to categorize hackers [Landreth, 1985; Hollinger, 1988; Chantler, 1996; Rogers, 2006].
Skill level is typically described as a composite function of: (1) programming skill (i.e., ability to create or modify
exploits and hacker tools), (2) system and network administration skill (i.e., ability to gain unauthorized access,
escalate privileges, navigate systems, reconfigure systems, and alter evidence of their presence), and (3)
cryptographic skill (i.e., ability to crack cryptographic algorithms). Figure 1 summarizes four hacker taxonomies that
use skill level to differentiate hackers.
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Increasing Skill Level

Hacker Taxonomies – Skill Level Dimension
Landreth

Hollinger

Chantler

Rogers

(1985)

(1988)

(1996)

(2006)

Thief

Cracker

Elite

Old Guard Hacker,
Professional Criminal,
Information Warrior,
Political Activist

Tourist

Virus Writer
Browser

Neophyte

Student

Internal

Petty Thief
Cyber-Punk

Novice

Pirate

Lamer

Novice

Note: The vertical distances between taxonomy categories is ordinal only, and each taxonomy should be considered independent
from the others (i.e., Hollinger‘s [1988] ―Browser‖ may or may not exhibit a skill level identical to Chantler‘s [1996] ―Neophyte‖).

Figure 1: Hacker Taxonomies – Skill Level.
Offender skill level is an important dimension to consider when examining the applicability of the five SCP theoretical
dimensions, because the offender‘s skill level influences their perception of countermeasures designed to increase
effort and risk. Highly skilled individuals may not be slowed by techniques that call for greater effort, whereas a less
skilled criminal probably will be. In the case of the highly skilled attacker, techniques that reduce the perceived
benefits of the crime become increasingly important, so as to make the crime unattractive.
Offender-Victim Relationship
The offender‘s relationship to the organizational target (―insider‖ vs. ―outsider‖) is an oft-cited attribute differentiating
computer criminals. This difference often affects the anatomy of the attack, the targeted or opportunistic nature of
the attack, and the offender‘s fear of being caught. Each of these affects the decision making process.
The anatomy of the attack is different for insiders and external hackers. Insiders have unique access, both electronic
and physical, to information systems. The external hackers‘ need to gain initial access, cover their tracks, and
implement back doors often diverge from those of insiders—insiders already have some level of access, and their
actions may be seen technologically as authorized given their role in the organization. Insiders also possess
advanced organizational knowledge not readily privy to an external hacker. The outsider or external hacker, must
often engage in additional steps related to target acquisition, such as footprinting, scanning, and enumeration [Bento
and Bento, 2004]. Such extra steps will affect the offender‘s perspective of the crime opportunity.
An external hacker may attack an opportunistic target or a specific, pre-determined target. An opportunistic attack is
likely to seek easy targets, and hence is more likely when the target is perceived to be vulnerable. Since an
opportunist is not targeting a specific victim, the offender-environment interaction becomes paramount. In a targeted
attack, however, the target is selected for some reason, which may extend beyond environmental variables. For
example, the identity thief targets a specific organization, due to the plethora of personal identifying information the
organization stores digitally; the recreational hacker targets a government agency, because of the conquest it
represents; and so on. In a targeted attack, the offender‘s perception of opportunity, in particular the choice of a
target, is not fully explained by the procedural view of the crime—offender motivation and individual characteristics
play a role.
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Insiders, by definition, attack their employing organization, and are, therefore, engaging in targeted attacks, although
the timing may be opportunistic. Frequently, insiders are disgruntled employees, motivated by specific employmentrelated grievances [Wilson et al., 1992; Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Rogers, 2006]. Such grievances tend to
rationalize, or justify computer crimes in the mind of the insider. This is keenly important to the ―remove excuses‖
and ―reduce provocations‖ dimensions of SCP. The external attacker is less likely provoked, and more likely
motivated by play or crime, which is important to the cost and benefit dimensions of SCP, more so than the excuses
and provocation dimensions. Of course, there are other SCP dimension combinations possible. For example, the
external hacktivist would be influenced by the excuses and provocation dimensions.
The ―risk of being caught‖ dimension is also important considering the offender-victim relationship. This dimension
has two elements: (1) incident detection and organizational recovery, and (2) offender apprehension and
punishment. The risk of being caught relative to incident detection and organization recovery is a function of the fact
that detection and recovery diminishes the utility of the attack. Often the attacker seeks long-term access to some
1
resource (e.g., warez site or pass-through victim), or information (e.g., identities or financial accounts). Detection
and recovery often disrupts such long-term access. The risk of being caught relative to apprehension and
punishment is a function of classic General Deterrence Theory. This second element is particularly important with
respect to the offender-victim relationship dimension. Insiders are more susceptible to general deterrence measures,
and are, therefore, more influenced by situational manipulations that increase the risk of being caught [Straub,
1990]. External hackers, on the other hand, are more difficult to detect and apprehend and are often under the
purview of other jurisdictional authorities, making apprehension and prosecution difficult, if not impossible. Thus,
different approaches may be necessary to reduce crime by insiders versus outsiders.
Offender Involvement
Offender involvement (or criminal involvement) refers to the centrality of criminal behavior (or criminality) to the
criminal‘s life—his/her time and his/her livelihood. Cornish and Clarke [2003] argue that criminal behavior is central
to the predator‘s life, marginal to the mundane criminal‘s life, and atypical of the provoked offender‘s life. Although
not expressed formally as a taxonomical dimension, prevailing hacker taxonomies imply varied levels of criminal
involvement. For example, Landreth‘s (1985) novice, student, and tourist categories suggest lesser commitment to
criminality as a way of life, than does his crasher category, which in turn suggests lesser commitment than his thief
category. This commitment continuum is also evident in Hollinger‘s (1988) pirate  browser  cracker taxonomy, in
Parker‘s (1998) career criminal  malicious hackers  pranksters (among others) taxonomy, and in Rogers‘ [2006]
professional criminals  petty thieves  cyber-punks (among others) taxonomy. Other taxonomies [Calkins, 2000;
Embar-Seddon, 2002] reflect similar criminal involvement categories as the Cornish and Clarke [2003] classification.
Thus, the Cornish and Clarke [2003] categorization (predator, mundane criminal, and provoked offender) provides a
good basis to differentiate levels of criminal involvement.
Offender involvement helps explain why different offenders perceive opportunity differently [Cornish and Clarke,
2003]. Anti-social predators are those offenders whose criminal ―readiness‖ is presumed. Mundane offenders are
normally receptive to criminal activity, but not necessarily ready at all times. Provoked offenders are normally not
ready, nor receptive to criminal activity, but are readied by provocative situational factors. The significance of this
offender attribute can be seen in the use of the approach to reduce provocation. The provoked offender is likely to
respond to reductions in provocation, but the anti-social predator, whose criminal involvement is not a response to
provocation, is less likely to respond to changes in provocation. A similar reaction would be expected with respect to
the criminal‘s perception of justification—excuses to commit the crime. The anti-social predator need not rationalize
the crime, whereas the mundane and provoked offenders may need to, thus perceptions of ―excuses‖ should
influence offender behavior along this dimension.
Criminal involvement also influences offender perception of, and reaction to, situational changes. For example, the
predatory criminal is already motivationally ready and has already made an involvement decision respecting crime
commission. Thus, he/she is more committed to crime commission and may be less perceptive to, and/or less
influenced by increased target hardening measures than the ―mundane offender,‖ whose criminal readiness is not
constant and cannot be presumed.
In summary, our proposed offender classification framework consists of four primary dimensions: offender
motivation, offender skill level, offender-victim relationship, and offender involvement. Motivation sub-dimensions
include: play, crime, hacktivism, and national security. Offender skill level sub-dimensions include: high, medium,
and low. Offender-victim relationship sub-dimensions include: insider and outsider. Offender involvement sub1

Warez sites are computers used to store cyber offender files and software, particularly those containing illegal, copyrighted, or contraband
content.
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dimensions include: anti-social predator, mundane offender, and provoked offender. Organizational information
security risks are classified according to this framework. This, of course, is limited to risks that are a function of
intentionally malicious acts, perpetrated by cyber offenders. Risks to information assets that stem from natural
disasters and human errors are not applicable to SCP opportunity reducing techniques.

The Proposed Modified Risk Management Process
In our approach, the overall risk management process is retained (i.e., identify assets, threats, vulnerability, risks,
and countermeasures, implement countermeasures, and evaluate). SCP is incorporated into this sequence by
modifying the threat and countermeasure identification steps (see Table 5). Step 2 of the Risk Management process,
―Threat Identification and Classification,‖ is modified by aggregating the identified risks and classifying them
according to the proposed offender classification framework. Step 5, ―Controls and Countermeasures Identification‖
is modified with the addition of two new sub-steps. First, SCP is applied at the meso-level by determining which of
the five SCP dimensions would influence perceptual opportunity and motivation of the offenders in each aggregated
threat class. Second, countermeasures are enumerated within each applicable SCP dimension. The operationallevel identification of countermeasures is not part of the strategy formulation process, but is part of the overall risk
management process and is, therefore, included. The modified risk management process is shown in Table 5.
Modifications are made as sub-steps—the major risk management process steps remain the same.

IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
To provide support for the proposed methodology, we present three illustrative cases, based on interviews with
senior executives of three real-world organizations. These cases show how the methodology is implemented and
demonstrate that the incorporation of SCP into the risk management process is relatively straight-forward, not
particularly resource intensive, and nets an expanded range of countermeasures to achieve organizational
information security objectives.

Data Gathering
We conducted one-on-one interviews (approximately forty-five minutes in duration) with the Chief Information
Security Officer (CISO) (or equivalent) of each of three real-world organizations (names changed to protect
anonymity). The organizations included: (1) a small Internet service and information technology service provider
(ITforYou, Inc.), (2) a large financial services company (MoneyCo.), and (3) a moderately sized independent, public
school district (EduISD). We obtained and documented information concerning each organization‘s information
assets, threats, risks, and countermeasures. We also obtained their subjective evaluation of their organization‘s
current information security effectiveness. We then applied our proposed methodology to each organization‘s
situation and presented each with a written analysis that: (1) classified their high-risk human threats according to our
proposed framework, (2) determined the applicability of SCP countermeasure categories (the five SCP dimensions)
to mitigate residual risk of the organization‘s high-risk human threats, and (3) recommended specific
countermeasures designed to influence their high risk human threats to not attack the organization. It took us an
average of three hours to prepare each report, including time for analysis and writing. After giving the CISOs several
days to evaluate the proposal, we asked them for feedback regarding the proposal. Essentially, we asked if they
thought such a strategy would improve their information security effectiveness (i.e., ―would it dissuade the target
offenders?‖), and whether the recommended countermeasures could reasonably be expected to be implemented in
their organization.
During each interview, we obtained a basic understanding of the organization, its mission, and their past risk
management activities. Respondents identified their key information assets, highest risk threats, general
countermeasures in place, and their prior experience with both successful and unsuccessful attempts involving those
threats. Responses are summarized in Table 6.
All three companies agreed with our conclusions that (a) their current strategy focuses on preventing and/or
detecting cyber crimes, and, (b) they do not specifically design countermeasures to influence offender decision
making and proactively deter them from attempting specific crimes against their organization. Each organization
rated their current information security effectiveness highly, but each indicated residual risk existed in key human
threat classes for which additional prevention and detection countermeasures are either not available, or have been
deemed nonviable solutions (e.g., too costly, impedes business operations, low residual risk).
After we completed each interview, we analyzed the information and made recommendations for security
countermeasures based on the proposed SCP-based risk management process. A full explanation of the application
of the modified risk management process to each organization is contained in Appendices 1 through 3. The following
sub-section provides a condensed analysis for the ITforYour, Inc. case to illustrate how the modified risk
management process is implemented. Following that, all three illustrative cases are comparatively summarized.
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Table 5: Modified Risk Management Process

Major Steps Remain
Unchanged

Additional Sub-Steps

1. Asset Identification and
Classification

a. Determine what the organization
needs to protect and to what
extent.

(none)

2. Threat Identification and
Classification

a. Determine who and what
represent risks to those assets.

b. Classify and group human
threats according to the
proposed offender
classification framework.

3. Vulnerability Identification
and Classification

a. Determine the organization‘s
weaknesses and how they relate
to assets from Step 1 and threats
from Step 2.

(none)

4. Risk Assessment

a. Quantitatively or qualitatively
determine the risk of each
vulnerability (considering asset
value, threat probability, loss
estimates, and vulnerability
exposure).

(none)

5. Controls and
Countermeasures
Identification

a. Design preventative solutions
(i.e. controls) to mitigate risks to
the extent deemed desirable/
acceptable, considering cost
(product costs, implementation
costs, and maintenance costs)
and operational impact.

b. Determine the applicability of
SCP‘s five countermeasure
categories for each human
threat class identified in Step
2b and selected for risk
mitigation in Step 4.

6. Controls and
Countermeasures
Implementation

a. Put controls in place
institutionally.

(none)

7. Re-evaluation

a. Continually examine the
effectiveness of current controls
and reconsider changes to
mission, assets, threats, and
vulnerabilities to identify
appropriate changes to the risk
management strategy.

(none)
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c. Identify countermeasures
that proactively influence
offender decision making in
accordance with the SCP
countermeasure categories
deemed applicable in Step
5b.

Table 6: Illustrative Cases—Situational Summary
ITforYou, Inc.
Organization
Type
Organization
Size
Organization
Location
Brief
Description

Key Assets

Primary
Threats

Main
Countermeasures

History of
Attacks

MoneyCo.

EduISD

Internet and IT services co.

Financial services co.

Public school district

Very small (2 people)

Large (5,800 people)

Large (3,000 staff and
students) (moderately sized
for a school district)

U.S. (Midwest)

U.S. (Southwest)

U.S. (Southwest)

Web hosting, programming,
data center services

Payment services, check
manufacturing, financial
marketing services

Kindergarten–12 grade
education

Hosted websites
Computing resources

Personally identifying info
Business financial data
Personal financial data

Personally identifying info
Student grades
Social program enrollment

1. External, target of
opportunity seekers
2. Anti-spam hacktivists who
believe ITforYou is
permitting spam (but e-mails
are not spam)

1. Cyber criminal seeking
personal and financial
data
2. External, recreational
hackers

1. Student users (insiders)
who are failing courses
and seek grade changes
2. Student users (insiders)
motivated by ―play‖

Tight technical controls,
maintains ―low profile‖

Formal, technical, informal
controls (in priority order)

Technical, formal, informal
controls (in priority order)

One successful target of
opportunity hack from external
source.
Several unsuccessful attacks
by anti-spam hacktivists who
mistakenly believe ITforYou is
permitting its customers to send
unsolicited e-mail promotions to
them.

Fallen victim to a wide variety
of attacks over the years, but
with low frequency.
Predominant attack in the
past was mischievous, target
of opportunity.
Predominant attack currently
is targeted attack related to
financial fraud and identity
theft.

Several successful attacks
and many more unsuccessful
attacks over the years by
both types of threats
identified above.
Frequency of successful
attacks has decreased, as
technical controls have
improved, but continue to
occur nonetheless.

th

Case Discussion: ITforYou, Inc.
Recall, the modified risk management process introduces three new sub-steps:
 Step 2b: Classify and group human threats according to the proposed offender classification framework.
 Step 5b: Determine the applicability of SCP‘s five countermeasure categories for each human threat class.
 Step 5c: Identify countermeasures that proactively influence offender decision making.
Our discussion focuses on the modifications to the risk management process.
ITforYou, Inc. identified two high-risk human threat classes: target of opportunity hackers and anti-spam hacktivists,
who believe ITforYou, Inc. is knowingly facilitating spam. In accordance with Step 2b of the modified risk
management process, we classified these threat classes according to the proposed offender classification
framework. Our classification is summarized in Table 7. A full explanation of this classification can be found in
Appendix 1. It is important to note that this classification is organization specific. For example, the classification is
not meant to suggest that all opportunists are medium to highly skilled, rather that ITforYou does not perceive poorly
skilled opportunists to be a threat, given their current security posture.
The goal of Step 5b is to determine the applicability of SCP‘s five countermeasure categories for each human threat
class identified in Step 2b and selected for risk mitigation in Step 4. Different SCP dimensions will be applicable in
different threat classes, both within and between organizations.
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Table 7: ITforYou Application of Offender Classification Framework
(Step 2b of the Modified Risk Management Process)

Threat Class*:
Framework
Dimension:

Opportunists

Anti-Spammers

Offender Motivation

Play, Crime,
National Sec.**

Hacktivism

Offender Skill

Med-High

Med-High

Offender-Victim
Relationship

Outsider

Outsider

Offender Involvement

Predator; Mundane

Provoked

* See Table 6 for further descriptive information of threat classes and organizations.
** Victim is a used as a ―pass-through‖ in the case of ‗national security‘ motivation.

The opportunist with whom ITforYou is concerned is moderately to highly skilled and is likely able to overcome
situational manipulations that increase perceived effort. However, because he is usually seeking a victim that he can
exploit quickly and easily, increasing perceived effort in committing the offense may be sufficient to thwart this
category of offender. In contrast, increasing the perceived effort will likely prove inconsequential for the anti-spam
hacktivist, because his skill level is probably relatively high and his target is specifically related to his motivation.
Increasing the perceived risk of detection may be beneficial in the case of the opportunist, but primarily from the
standpoint that detection may impede the utility of the hack (e.g., long-term use of the resource or information). The
hacktivist, on the other hand, wishes to be detected. Without detection, his point is not made. Detection risk from the
standpoint of apprehension and punishment is probably inconsequential to both offenders. Neither believes their
acts will likely be attributed to them, given the relative impunity with which cyber offenders are often able to operate.
Decreasing anticipated benefits is a difficult proposition to use in defending against both classes of offenders.
Opportunistic hackers have no prior knowledge of the value of information in the computer system, nor the value of
the system as a computing resource. Hence, it is difficult to formulate mechanisms to alter their perception of the
value of information assets in the system, or of the utility of the system as a computing resource. The primary benefit
that the hacktivist is seeking is the cessation of the alleged spam. Self-gratification from retribution might be a
secondary anticipated benefit. For this SCP category to be useful in influencing offender decision making, the
organization must make the hacktivist believe that attacking them will not result in the cessation of the alleged spam,
nor will it bring them satisfaction from retribution. Given the offender‘s probable skill level, it is unlikely that the
organization can effectively convince him of either reduced benefit.
The fourth SCP dimension influencing the offender‘s perception of opportunity is rationalization/justification. SCP
argues that if the offender can mentally excuse their criminal behavior, they will be more inclined to make an event
decision to commit a crime. The opportunist may internally justify their crimes as harmless if their motivation is play.
The opportunist does not seek justification if their motivation is crime or national security; they know their crime is
illegal. Regardless of their motivation, however, a target of opportunity does not likely have a means for reducing the
opportunist‘s perception of rationalization and justification. On the other hand, this dimension is important to the antispam hacktivist. He rationalizes that ―hacking back‖ is justified, because ITforYou, Inc. is culpable in the situation.
Accordingly, countermeasures that remove the hacktivist‘s excuse will likely influence their decision making and
proactively influence them to not attack ITforYou, Inc.
The last SCP dimension is provocation. The opportunist is not provoked, particularly as it pertains to an event
decision involving a specific target. They have made an involvement decision to engage in crime, but their specific
event decision is not provoked. The anti-spam hacktivist, on the other hand, is provoked upon receiving what he
believes is spam. Accordingly, countermeasures that lessen the hacktivist‘s provocation, will likely influence their
decision making and proactively influence them to not attack ITforYou, Inc.
This analysis concludes Step 5b of the modified RM process. Our conclusions are summarized in Table 8.
Volume 26
342

Article 17

Table 8: Applicability of SCP Dimensions to ITforYou
(Step 5b of the Modified Risk Management Process)

Threat Class*
SCP Dimension

Opportunists

Increase
Perceived Effort




Increase
Perceived Risk

Anti-Spammers

Decrease
Anticipated
Benefit
Remove Excuses
Reduce
Provocations




* See Table 6 for further descriptive information of threat classes .
Key: A check mark indicates the respective SCP dimension has definite
potential for yielding new, additional countermeasures for the threat class.

While the operational, micro-level analysis that identifies specific countermeasures (Step 5c of the modified risk
management process) is not part of the information security strategy formulation, we continue the discussion for the
ITforYou, Inc. case by identifying some influential countermeasures to help the reader conceptualize the entire
approach, and to demonstrate that useful countermeasures do surface. Using the script-theoretic approach,
countermeasure identification is facilitated by considering the crime sequence, or script actions. In our approach,
countermeasure identification is facilitated by identifying the applicable SCP dimensions for threats classified
according to the proposed offender classification framework.
ITforYou, Inc. identified two possibly useful SCP dimensions for the opportunist threat class: increased perceived
effort and increased perceived risk of being caught. While increasing required offender effort through stronger
technical defenses will likely deflect opportunist, this is a preventive measure. If ITforYou, Inc. could proactively
notify would-be offenders of the increased defenses, then they would influence their offenders and dissuade them.
However, since the opportunist likely initiates automated scans of large IP address ranges for potential targets,
ITforYou, Inc. questions whether they could proactively communicate such increased defenses to would-be
offenders. Similar rationale holds true for the ―increase perceived risk of detection‖ category. In short, ITforYou, Inc.
decides that while possible, influencing offender decision making is not an effective means for reducing the residual
risk of the target of opportunity threat class. They decide not to identify and implement additional countermeasures
designed to increase the opportunistic hacker‘s perception of the effort required and risk of being detected.
On the other hand, ITforYou, Inc. sees significant potential in the notion that they can reduce the provocations that
incite anti-spam hacktivists, and that they can decrease anti-spam hacktivists‘ ability to rationalize and justify their
hacktivist behavior. One possible approach might be to post a message on ITforYou, Inc.‘s company website. The
message would explain the source of and reason for the e-mails, i.e., that the e-mails are being sent by ITForYou,
Inc., on behalf of vendors, who market via e-mail using e-mail addresses directly supplied by the recipients and/or
legally obtained through the purchase of mailing/marketing lists. This, as well as reminding offenders that hacking is
illegal, may serve to remove excuses (rationalization/justification) from offenders. Finally, the promotional messages,
which are being viewed as spam, should provide a mechanism for disgruntled recipients to opt out of receiving such
messages, complain to ITforYou, and/or complain to the sender. In short, ITforYou, Inc. provides an alternative
solution for the would-be attacker, reduces the attacker‘s frustration (i.e., provocation), and/or convinces the
hacktivist that retaliation is not warranted. Depending on the prominence of the website message, it is reasonable to
presume that the hacktivist will see the message, because viewing the target‘s website is a very standard
reconnaissance step for hackers [Bento and Bento, 2004].
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Table 9 summarizes the above analysis—Step 5c, countermeasure identification, for the ITforYou, Inc. case. For
opportunists, two SCP dimensions were identified to reduce offender propensity to commit crime: (1) increase
perceived effort, and (2) increase perceived risk. However, the analysis did not surface any additional, new
countermeasures over those already in place. For the anti-spammers, the SCP dimensions with potential to
influence offender decision making are: (1) remove excuses, and (2) reduce provocations. Several countermeasures
are identified, such as do not send unwanted e-mails, explain source of and reason for e-mail, and so on. In effect,
the analysis nets new and unique countermeasures other approaches would not typically net, since other
approaches are biased toward prevention and detection, as well as procedural interruption, rather than offender
dissuasion (or deterrence) via the rational choice perspective.
Table 9: Countermeasure Identification for ITforYou
(Step 5c of the Modified Risk Management Process)
Threat Class*:
SCP Dimension:

Opportunists

Anti-Spammers

Increase Perceived Effort

No New Countermeasures

Not Applicable

Increase Perceived Risk

No New Countermeasures

Not Applicable

Decrease Anticipated
Benefit

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Remove Excuses

Not Applicable

Explain source and reason for e-mails. Do not
send unwanted e-mails. Remind that hacking
is a crime.

Reduce Provocations

Not Applicable

Provide instructions for opt-out process.
Explain source of and reason for e-mails.

* See Table 6 for further descriptive information of threat classes.

This concludes the specific discussion of the ITforYou, Inc. case, which highlights the implementation of the modified
risk management process. Further detail is provided in the supporting appendices. The following section provides a
short, comparative analysis of all three illustrative cases. The goal is to demonstrate that different SCP dimensions
are influential across cyber offender threat classes, which vary across organizations.

Comparative Analysis Across All Three Cases
After each interview, we classified aggregated human threats according to the proposed offender classification
framework, in accordance with Step 2b of the modified risk management process. Our classification is summarized
in Table 10. The practitioners involved in the three illustrative cases were in general agreement with our application
of the framework. However, in practice, the framework should be applied by individuals very familiar with the
organization‘s security issues.
Steps 3, 4, and 5a of the risk management process remain as they were before, so next we applied SCP at a mesolevel, in accordance with Step 5b of the modified risk management process. The application determined the
applicability of the five SCP countermeasure categories (theoretical dimensions) for each human threat class
identified in Step 2b and selected for risk mitigation. Table 11 provides a summary of the results of SCP application
to each category of identified offenders for the different organizations.
At this point, the process of strategy formulation is complete, i.e., the SCP dimensions which will guide
countermeasure selection have been identified. The identification of the specific countermeasures is an operational
step. The goal of the article was to propose an approach to strategy formulation. Nonetheless, we continued on to
identify the operational measures to demonstrate that the process yields meaningful countermeasures not previously
considered by the CISOs of the organizations studied.
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Table 10: Illustrative Cases—Application of Offender Classification Framework
(Step 2b of the Modified Risk Management Process)

ITforYou, Inc.

EduISD

2
AntiSpammers

1
Financial
Fraudsters

2
Recreational
Hackers

1
Grade
Changers

2
ScriptKiddies

Play, Crime,
National
Sec.**

Hacktivism

Crime

Play

Crime

Play

Offender
Skill

Med-High

Med-High

High

Med-High

Low-High

Low-Med

Off.-victim
Relationship

Outsider

Outsider

Outsider

Outsider

Insider
(student)

Insider
(student)

Offender
Involvement

Predator;
Mundane

Provoked

Predator

Mundane

Provoked

Mundane

Threat
Class*:
Offender
Motivation

1
Opportunists

MoneyCo.

* See Table 6 for further descriptive information of each threat classes and organizations.
** Victim is a used as a ―pass-through‖ in the case of ‗national security‘ motivation.

Table 11: Applicability of SCP Dimensions to Illustrative Cases
(Step 5b of the Modified Risk Management Process)
ITforYou, Inc.
Threat
Class*

1
Opportunists

2
AntiSpammers

MoneyCo.
1
Financial
Fraudsters

EduISD

2
Recreational
Hackers

1
Grade
Changers

2
ScriptKiddies



Increase
Perceived
Effort







Increase
Perceived
Risk











Decrease
Anticipated
Benefit
Remove
Excuses



Reduce
Provocations







* See Table 6 for further descriptive information of threat classes and organizations .
Key: A check mark indicates the SCP dimension has definite potential for yielding new, additional countermeasures for the threat class.

Once an organization applies the offender classification framework and intellectually considers the utility of each
SCP dimension, specific countermeasure identification exercises follow, in accordance with Step 5c of the modified
risk management process. These countermeasures are summarized in Table 12. Note, this table reflects only
additional, new countermeasures identified by the application of SCP. The application will likely net some
countermeasures that current approaches already identify, which is an added benefit, but we focus our results and
discussion only on what is new.
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The operational countermeasure identification process is facilitated by the meso-level application of SCP, in that the
classic SCP 25-cell table of opportunity reducing techniques is reduced to the subset of columns deemed applicable
during Step 5b of the modified risk management process. Once the appropriate SCP dimensions are identified, the
rows within the table are considered. This approach reduces the complexity of operational countermeasure decision
making process.
Table 12: Sample New Countermeasures
(Step 5c of the Modified Risk Management Process)

ITforYou, Inc.
Threat Class*:

1
Opportunists

Increase
Perceived
Effort

No new
measures
identified

Increase
Perceived
Risk

MoneyCo.

EduISD

2
AntiSpammers

1
Financial
Fraudsters

2
Recreational
Hackers

1
Grade
Changers

2
ScriptKiddies

N/A

Compartmentalize
information

N/A

Double entry
requirements

No new
measures
identified

No new
measures
identified

N/A

IDS/IPS; file
access audits;
customer alert
processes

N/A

File access
audits

N/A

Decrease
Anticipated
Benefit

N/A

N/A

Very Strong
Encryption

N/A

Change
notifications

N/A

Remove
Excuses

N/A

Website
notices

N/A

No new
measures
identified

N/A

No new
measures
identified

Reduce
Provocations

N/A

Opt-out
process

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

* See Table 6 for further descriptive information.

To recap, we provided each organization with a written proposal that: (1) classified their aggregated high-risk human
threats according to our proposed framework, (2) identified the appropriate balance of SCP countermeasure
categories to mitigate residual risk of the organization‘s high-risk human threats, and (3) recommended specific
countermeasures designed to influence their high risk human threats to not attack the organization. After giving them
several days to evaluate the proposal, we asked each organization (the same respondent originally interviewed) for
feedback regarding the proposal. In each case, the response was very positive. All three CISOs expressed interest
in the approach, said it was something they had not previously considered, thought it showed promise for reducing
their residual risk, and thought the recommended countermeasures were feasible. We acknowledge the possibility of
demand bias in their responses. The effectiveness of operational countermeasures suggested by us will need to be
demonstrated in field sites to fully validate the usefulness of the proposed method.

V. CONCLUSION
Contributions
This research makes five significant contributions to the area of information security strategy formulation. First, our
approach yields an expanded range of information security countermeasures, specifically those that proactively
influence offender decision making by altering their perception of effort, risk, benefit, rationalization, and provocation.
This is an approach to crime-reduction that is not typically considered by organizations when formulating information
security strategy, whose focus tends to net preventive and detective countermeasures. Our approach extends SCP
to the digital realm with an emphasis on offenders‘ rational decision making. SCP is a robust and well-established
theory in the area of criminal justice that has benefitted from several decades of intellectual debates. It is
theoretically complete, i.e., it includes all factors that offenders take into consideration, consciously or
subconsciously, in their decision to engage in a crime.
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Second, we provide a methodology for netting the expanded range of information security countermeasures
discussed above. The method adapts the most widely used strategy formulation approach currently used—the risk
management process. It introduces no new major steps and adds only a few new sub-steps. The methodology is
relatively simple and quick to employ. We proposed an offender classification framework, based on past literature
and by integrating several widely accepted cyber offender taxonomies. The framework enables organizations to
group similar human threats into classes, which then facilitates the meso-level application of SCP. The meso-level
application of SCP then provides a framework by which organizations can identify appropriate countermeasure
categories (effort, risk, benefit, justification, and provocation) for each human threat class. This ultimately facilitates
the countermeasure identification process.
The third contribution of this article is our demonstration that meso-level application of SCP is both possible and
useful for strategy formulation. Previous proponents of SCP have argued that a micro-level analysis of the steps
necessary to execute a crime is necessary to effectively implement security measures based on SCP. While we
agree that a crime specific, procedurally oriented view can identify unique countermeasures, we have demonstrated
the utility of the meso-level application of SCP and the rational choice perspective. In particular, SCP can help
identify categories of countermeasures to be considered based on the framework that we have proposed.
Fourth, our approach emphasizes the influence of perceptual opportunity on offender decision making, whereas past
extensions of SCP to the digital realm [Willison, 2006b; Willison and Backhouse, 2006; Willison and Siponen, 2009]
have focused on the procedural aspects of crime commission. While past extensions have netted new
countermeasures beyond those produced by traditional approaches, they are still largely preventive and detective in
nature. Our approach focuses on influencing offender decision making—proactively dissuading them from wanting to
attempt a crime. The procedural view, specifically through the use of crime scripts, provides ―… a clearer
understanding of which safeguards to implement‖ [Willison and Siponen, 2009, p. 135]. Still, as with traditional
approaches, the emphasis is on safeguards, i.e. controls. Our focus is on perception of costs, benefits, excuses, and
provocations, rather than on safeguards that digitally prevent or detect cyber offenses.
The fifth contribution is empirical. The proposed method was used to analyze the security strategy of three real life
companies. The analysis surfaced two points worthy of note. One, the method surfaced additional categories of
countermeasures not typically surfaced by current approaches—specifically, countermeasures that change offender
perception of benefit, justification, and provocation. These additional categories can yield simple and inexpensive
solutions, as evidenced by the cases analyzed in the current article. Two, the method surfaced new
countermeasures in categories typically surfaced by current approaches—specifically, countermeasures that change
offender perception of effort and risk.

Limitations and Future Research
There are two limitations that suggest the need for additional research to put our proposal on a stronger foundation.
First, this research assumes that cyber offenders will be influenced by SCP technique categories (effort, risk, benefit,
justification, and provocation), as has been shown to be the case in the physical realm. The effectiveness of the SCP
categories has been empirically validated for the physical realm. The effectiveness of SCP categories that increase
effort and increase risk in the cyber realm has been empirically validated to some extent, although research has not
separated the impacts of such countermeasures with respect to controls-based prevention versus detection versus
decision making influence. Further validation of the effectiveness of increasing perceived effort and increasing
perceived risk is necessary, as is the validation of the effectiveness of reducing perceptions of benefits, justification
and provocation in the cyber realm. Empirical research is needed to determine to what extent cyber offenders‘
rational decision making process mirrors that of non-cyber offenders, what differences exist, and why differences
exist (if they do). Preliminary evidence can be gathered using laboratory experiments, but will have to be
corroborated with field data.
Also, this research assumes that successfully manipulating the SCP techniques will raise the security effectiveness
of the organization. The question remains, however, do countermeasures based on SCP technique categories
actually result in greater information security effectiveness for the organization? The empirical demonstration of the
effectiveness of the new categories of countermeasures (benefit, justification, and provocation), as well as the new
view of existing categories (effort and risk) requires organizations to implement and evaluate solutions. To the best
of our knowledge, no organization has implemented such techniques.
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Concluding Remarks
Currently, risk management and standards-based approaches guide the development of security strategies in
organizations. However, such approaches typically surface only countermeasures designed to prevent and detect
cyber offenses. They do not typically surface countermeasures designed to influence cyber offender decision
making, i.e., is it beneficial to the criminal to target a specific organization, at a specific time, for a specific reason, in
a specific manner? We have proposed the use of SCP and the rational choice perspective to fill this gap. We
integrated it into a modified risk management approach and provided a supporting cyber offender classification
framework, based on past literature and cyber offender taxonomies. The framework enables us to apply the SCP
concepts at a meso-level, which is useful in strategy formulation. We gathered qualitative data about security
strategies currently employed by three organizations, and then provided theoretically logical arguments to
demonstrate that SCP may facilitate in the identification of additional countermeasure categories (benefit,
justification, and rationalization) and new countermeasures in existing categories (effort and risk).
The war against computer crime is seemingly endless. Stronger, more complex, more expensive technical defenses
soon reach a point of diminishing returns. Also, apprehension and prosecution of criminals has limited potential for
computer crime committed from afar. Hence, the two commonly used approaches to fight computer crime (risk
management and baseline security standards approaches), which focus on prevention and detection, may not be
sufficient in all cases. We argue that it is necessary to continue to search for other methods to reduce the incidence
of computer crimes. Toward this end, we have proposed the incorporation of SCP into the risk management process
for formulating information security strategy. Doing so results in an innovative approach to IS security strategy
development—one that surfaces an expanded range of measures to reduce computer crime.
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APPENDIX 1—CASE 1 ANALYSIS
CASE OVERVIEW
Organization: ―ITforYou, Inc.‖
Organization Type: Small Internet Service Provider (ISP)
Brief Overview of Organization: ―ITforYou, Inc.‖ is a very small business that provides Internet and information
technology services (e.g. web hosting, programming, and data center services) in support of customers‘ business
operations. They have been in business for approximately fifteen years. It is essentially a one-person company, with
the exception of occasional part-time support over the years. The company‘s owner/manager does not have formal
education, training, or certifications in information security, but has self-taught himself information security and takes
it very seriously.
Prior Attacks: To the best of the owner/manager‘s knowledge, ITforYou, Inc. has been successfully hacked only
once since the company‘s inception. His internal investigation disclosed that he was a target of opportunity for the
hacker—the hacker scanned a wide range of systems for a specific vulnerability and hacked ITforYou, Inc. upon
realizing the company site was vulnerable. The owner/manager is aware of frequent, targeted attempts to hack into
the company‘s system by individuals who receive e-mail that they perceive to be spam, but which is actually
legitimate e-mail from legitimate companies, who are customers of ITforYou, Inc.
Perceived Threats (Step 2a): ITforYou, Inc. perceives two primary threats—the opportunist seeking a target of
opportunity and the anti-spam hacktivist receiving what they believe is spam from ITforYou, Inc.
Opportunist: The opportunist typically seeks systems that are vulnerable to specific exploits possessed by the
attacker. The attacker is seldom seeking specific information. Rather, the attacker is seeking a storage location for
their ―warez,‖ a pass-through point to facilitate other crimes, or computers that they can control (i.e., ―zombies‖) in
the furtherance of other goals (e.g., establishing communication networks and launching distributed attacks).
Anti-Spam Hacktivist: The anti-spam hacktivists attack systems for one of two reasons, usually. First, the system,
or the attack of the system, may provide a ―stage‖ from which the hacktivists can communicate their ‖message.‖
Second, the hacktivists might target specific systems they believe are facilitating the dissemination of spam. The
latter is the case here. In this case, the hacktivist(s) is(are) trying to send a message to the victim company,
ITforYou, Inc.—―stop sending and facilitating spam.‖ The hacktivists incorrectly believe ITforYou, Inc. is permitting
and facilitating its clients to spam the hacktivists and others.
Security Measures Implemented: The primary approach to information security at ITforYou, Inc. is to ―lock
everything down‖ as much as possible and stay ―below the radar‖ of would-be attackers. Locking down refers to
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ensuring that unnecessary ports and services are unavailable, maximally restrictive firewall policies are in force,
patches against vulnerabilities are diligently implemented, and an effective antivirus solution is employed. The
owner/security officer asserts these actions protect company assets from external script-kiddies seeking a target of
opportunity. He consciously maintains a ―low profile‖ to minimize the risk that the company will be targeted for
attacks for specific resources and/or information. The company seldom employs support staff, and those who are
employed are personally known to the owner, are given limited permissions, and are not perceived to be a potential
insider threat.
CASE ANALYSIS
Other Threats to Consider: None. Based on the general information provided to us, we assessed whether
additional threats exist. In the case of this company, we do not see any additional threats of significance.
Application of the Offender Classification Framework (Step 2b)
Opportunists: Opportunist attackers motivated by play may victimize a vulnerable organization for any of the
reasons listed above (store warez, control zombies, and/or obtain pass-through points). Those motivated by crime
either seek pass-through points, or are targeting certain types of information and are indiscriminate about the source
of the information (e.g., anyone‘s personal identifying information, not a specific person‘s identifying information).
Those motivated by anti-national pursuits are most likely seeking a pass-through point. The single motivation absent
is hacktivism. Hacktivists typically seek targets to send a message to the world, or to obtain information of value
pertaining to the hacktivist cause. Targets of opportunity are inconsistent with the notion of obtaining specific
information. They may seek targets of opportunity to send a message, but for the hacktivists‘ message to have a
high impact, the hacked site must be prominent and have high a traffic level. ITforYou, Inc. does not have a
sufficiently high profile for hacktivists with a general message to the world at large. So, we argue that the motivation
of the opportunist in the case of ITforYou, Inc. is not likely to be one of hacktivism.
Opportunists can exhibit a wide variety of skill levels. Because ITforYou, Inc. believes they are well protected
through vigilant security, they do not perceive low-skilled opportunists to be much of a threat. However, more highly
skilled opportunists may pose a greater threat to their organization. The opportunist here is external to the
organization, and such activity is not atypical of his/her day-to-day life. The criminal activity is either marginal to their
daily lives, or central to it. In other words, it is more systemic than occurring solely due to provocation.
Based on this reasoning, we characterize this threat according to the framework as follows:
Offender motivation: Play, Crime, National Security (victim is a ―pass-through‖ mechanism)
Offender skill: Medium to High
Offender–victim relationship: Outsider
Offender Involvement: Anti-social predator, Mundane
Anti-Spam Hacktivists: In this case, the hacktivist is trying to send a message specifically to the victim company,
ITforYou, Inc. The company is being incorrectly perceived as facilitating spam from its clients to the hacktivist and
others. We argue that the hacktivist is likely to possess medium to high levels of technical skills. Individuals with
lower levels of skills are more likely to just ignore the spam, tighten their spam controls, or just complain either to
ITforYou, Inc. or the client company. The offender is external to the organization and is provoked upon receiving
what he/she perceives is spam.
Based on this reasoning, we characterize this threat according to the framework as follows:
Offender motivation: Hacktivism
Offender skill: Medium to High
Offender–victim relationship: Outsider
Offender Involvement: Provoked
Meso-Level Application of SCP (Step 5b): We assessed each of the five factors from SCP for their potential to
help reduce the likelihood of crime by each of the two categories of identified offenders.
Opportunists
Increasing Perceived Effort: Increasing the offender‘s perceived effort to commit the crime will deflect hackers who
are looking for a target of opportunity, because they are looking for relatively quick and/or easy targets.
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Increase Perceived Risk: Risk of being caught has two elements: (1) offender apprehension and punishment, and
(2) incident detection and organizational recovery. Increasing perceived risk of apprehension and punishment will
probably not be very successful for a number of reasons. First, external hackers are often under the purview of other
jurisdictional authorities, making apprehension and prosecution difficult, if not impossible. Second, it is a common
and relatively successful tactic for attackers to ―hop through‖ multiple compromised systems, thereby successfully
disguising their original point of origin. Third, the number of cyber attack cases successfully prosecuted relative to
the number of incidents is relatively low, and the severity of punishment in those cases is also low. In all, cyber
offenders operate with relative impunity. Thus, increasing the perceived risk of being caught with respect to
apprehension and punishment is not a particularly worthwhile approach.
However, increasing perceived risk with respect to incident detection and organizational recovery will likely deflect
hackers. In many cases, opportunists desire long-term availability and access concerning the victimized system. If
the attack is detected, the organization will contain, eradicate, and recover from the attack. As a result, the offender‘s
access to the system and availability of the system‘s resources ends. Thus, increasing perceived risk of the incident
being detected is a worthwhile approach.
Decrease Anticipated Benefits: Opportunistic hackers have no prior knowledge of the value of information in the
computer system, nor the value of the system as a computing resource. Hence, it is difficult to formulate
mechanisms to alter their perception of the value of information assets in the system, or of the utility of the system as
a computing resource.
Reducing Justification: Hackers who are motivated by the crime or anti-national activity do not engage in
rationalization, because the criminal activity is central to their life as predatory offenders. In the case of hackers who
are motivated by play, justification would be relevant to consider. However, we contend that changing this perception
will be difficult, and influencing their perception of the effort required and/or risk of incident detection will be much
easier. Thus, while this SCP category is potentially applicable, it is not recommended.
Reducing Provocation: The hackers in this category are not being provoked. So, the issue of reducing provocation
does not arise.
Anti-Spam Hacktivists
Increasing Perceived Effort: In this case, hacktivists are not likely to be dissuaded by increasing perceived effort.
They are skillful and have a message to deliver specifically to ITforYou, Inc. So, the hackers are likely to be
persistent. Given that they are skillful, risk from this source will continue despite strong technical defenses.
Increasing Perceived Risk: Again, risk of being caught has two elements: (1) offender apprehension and
punishment, and (2) incident detection and organizational recovery. Since the hacktivist desires to send a message
to ITforYou, Inc., the hacktivist wants to be detected. Thus, increasing perceived risk of incident detection is not
applicable in this case. Theoretically, increasing perceived risk of offender apprehension and punishment is
applicable, but for the same reasons as for the opportunist, the offender is unlikely to believe that apprehension is
likely, and will be even less likely to fear probable punishment(s).
Decreasing Anticipated Benefits: The primary benefit that the hacker is seeking is the cessation of the alleged spam.
Self-gratification from retribution might be a secondary anticipated benefit. For this SCP category to be useful in
influencing offender decision making, the organization must make the hacktivist believe that attacking them will not
result in the cessation of the alleged spam, nor will it bring them satisfaction from retribution. Given the offender‘s
probable skill level, we do not believe the organization can effectively convince him of either reduced benefit.
Decreasing Justification: The hacker justifies their behavior by rationalizing that he/she needs to send a message to
the company that engages in the unethical practice of spam. If situational manipulations could remove (or lessen)
the hacktivist‘s ability to rationalize and justify their actions, they would likely be dissuaded from attacking. This might
be accomplished by website notices that: (1) explain ITforYou‘s zero-tolerance policy for spamming, (2) explain that
e-mails from specific clients are not spam and are sent out as part of legitimate marketing campaigns using e-mail
addresses legally obtained (e.g., supplied by the recipient or contained in legally purchased marketing/mailing lists).
Decreasing Provocation: The alleged spam is the provocation. Removing, lessening, or reversing the provocation
will dissuade the offender from attacking. In this case, this can be accomplished if the hacker is able to understand
why the e-mail is not spam, but a message of potential use, or, if the e-mails are stopped. This can be accomplished
by (a) providing means for the individual to be taken off the mailing list, and/or (b) affording the individual a
mechanism to inquire why the message is being sent to him/her. These actions will either cause the e-mails to no
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longer be seen as spam, or to cease. In either case, the provocation will cease to exist, and consequently there will
be no more hacking.
In summary, our analysis suggests that increasing the effort, and increasing the risk, of detection are approaches to
influence the opportunists‘ perception of the crime opportunity, and, reducing justification and reducing provocation
are two approaches to influence the hacktivists‘ perception of the crime opportunity.
Countermeasure Identification (Step 5c): This discussion does not include countermeasure identification,
because the focus of our research is information security strategy development, not operational level
countermeasure identification.

APPENDIX 2—CASE 2 ANALYSIS
CASE OVERVIEW
Organization: ―MoneyCo.‖
Organization Type: Large Financial Services Company
Brief overview of Organization: ―MoneyCo.‖ is a large business that provides financial services (e.g., payment
services, check manufacturing, and financial marketing services) to customers—both individuals and companies.
Because of the nature of their business, they possess important personally identifying information (PII) and
confidential financial data that can be criminally exploited (e.g., for identity theft and financial fraud). MoneyCo. has a
well-qualified Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and a highly skilled information security team.
Prior Attacks: MoneyCo. states they have fallen victim to a wide variety of attacks and attackers over the years, but
indicates the frequency of incidents is low. They did not provide additional information regarding the attacks, but
instead focused on characterizing the attackers involved in the attacks.
Perceived Threats (Step 2a): MoneyCo. perceives two primary threats—the financial fraudster and the recreational
hacker. It could be argued that the opportunist is a threat to any organization, however, MoneyCo.‘s risk assessment
did not identify that threat as a significant risk, due to its highly vigilant and strong security posture.
Financial Fraudster: This offender is part of the growing criminal industry of identity theft and online financial fraud.
To facilitate their crimes, this offender seeks PII and access to financial information and systems. This offender is a
threat to organizations, because PII theft is subject to regulatory oversight, and can lead to financial liability, loss of
customer confidence, bad publicity, and lost revenue. This is currently MoneyCo.‘s highest risk threat.
Recreational Hacker: The recreational hacker is motivated by ―play.‖ The offender targets MoneyCo. out of pure
mischief, curiosity, and challenge. Here the value to the hacker is the thrill and possible accolades of successfully
hacking a large, well-known company. This used to be their highest risk human threat, but is currently considered to
be a relatively low-risk threat relative to the financial fraudster threat.
Security Measures Implemented: MoneyCo. has formally dedicated manpower and monetary resources toward
the identification and assessment of risks to its information security. They have a multifaceted security program,
which includes technical, formal, and informal controls. Their program also incorporates a wide range of security
assessments and audits, including internal vulnerability assessments, patch compliance reviews, strict configuration
management controls, external audits, and reviews of policies, processes, and procedures. MoneyCo. consciously
attempts to stay ―below the radar‖ of would-be attackers, so as to not call attention to themselves, their information,
and their resources.
CASE ANALYSIS
Other Threats to Consider: None. Based on the general information provided to us, we assessed whether
additional threats exist. In the case of this company, we do not see any additional threats of significance.
Application of the Offender Classification Framework (Step 2b)
Financial Fraudster: Because the financial fraudsters‘ goal is criminal—identity theft and/or financial fraud—their
motivation is clearly ―crime.‖ They could be internal or external to the organization, but MoneyCo. is particularly
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concerned about the external threat. The financial fraudsters, who have chosen cyber space as the environment for
their criminal activity, are probably technically skilled, else they would have chosen to operate in the non-cyber
environment. Externally situated financial fraudsters are likely engaging in such activity as a way of making a living.
Based on this reasoning, we characterize this threat according to the framework as follows:
Offender motivation: Crime
Offender skill: Moderate to High
Offender–victim relationship: Outsider
Crime Involvement: Anti-social predator
Recreational Hacker: Because the recreational hackers‘ end-goal is not criminal, and because they target
organizations out of curiosity or for a challenge, their motivation is clearly ―play.‖ Recreational hackers can exhibit a
wide variety of skill levels, but because MoneyCo. believes they are well protected through vigilant security, they do
not perceive low-skilled hackers to be much of a threat. The recreational hackers here are external to the
organization, as internal employees engaging in recreational hacking would not likely target their own organization
for fear of detection and punishment. Hacking is not central to the day-to-day life of the recreational hackers, nor
does it require provocation. Based on this reasoning, we characterize this threat according to the framework as
follows:
Offender motivation: Play
Offender skill: Medium to High
Offender-victim relationship: Outsider
Crime Involvement: Mundane
Meso-Level Application of SCP (Step 5b): We assessed each of the five factors from SCP for their potential to
help reduce the likelihood of crime by each of the two categories of identified offenders.
Financial Fraudsters
Increasing Perceived Effort: On the one hand, moderately to highly skilled offenders will not be deterred by
increases in the perceived effort required, because they believe they can overcome things that alter this perception
(i.e., target hardening mechanisms). On the other hand, MoneyCo. is concerned with the financial fraudster who
seeks PII and financial data in general, not that of someone in particular. So, in a sense, the offender seeks targets
of opportunity within a certain class of targets—those storing PII and financial data. Accordingly, increasing the
offender‘s perceived effort to commit the crime will deflect financial fraudsters, because they are looking for relatively
quick and/or easy targets.
Increased Perceived Risk: Risk of being caught has two elements: (1) offender apprehension and punishment, and
(2) incident detection and organizational recovery. Increasing perceived risk of apprehension and punishment will
probably not be very successful for a number of reasons. First, external hackers are often under the purview of other
jurisdictional authorities, making apprehension and prosecution difficult, if not impossible. Second, it is a common
and relatively successful tactic for attackers to ―hop through‖ multiple compromised systems, thereby successfully
disguising their original point of origin. Third, the number of cyber attack cases successfully prosecuted relative to
the number of incidents is relatively low, and the severity of punishment in those cases is also low. In all, cyber
offenders operate with relative impunity. Thus, increasing the perceived risk of being caught with respect to
apprehension and punishment is not a particularly worthwhile approach.
However, increasing perceived risk with respect to incident detection and organizational recovery will likely deflect
financial fraudsters. In the case of identity theft, offenders often wish to ‖use‖ the identity for some period of time to
obtain maximum benefit from the false ID. With respect to financial fraud, offenders may seek only short-term access
to financial data (e.g., credit card information), so as to minimize the risk of being apprehended (i.e., repeated use
increases the chances of being caught). Other times, they may seek long-term access, so as to gain maximum
benefit from the access and/or data (e.g., embezzle small amounts of money over a long period of time to minimize
suspicion, but maximize benefit). In any case, if the organization can detect and respond to such compromised data
quickly, continued utility of the data might be lessened. For instance, if a credit card is stolen and the theft is known,
the credit card number can be deactivated. Similarly, one benefit of a social security number lies in its use in
acquiring additional credit cards. Thus, if a social security number is stolen, then steps can be taken to register with
credit agencies to monitor if unauthorized requests for credit cards are being made. These mechanisms lessen the
utility of the information upon incident detection. Thus, increasing the perception of the risk of incident detection is a
worthwhile approach.
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Reducing Anticipated Benefit: The anticipated benefits of the financial fraudster include: (1) utility of stolen
information in furtherance of identity theft and financial fraud schemes, and/or (2) access to key financial systems to
divert funds for their personal use. For this SCP category to be useful in influencing offender decision making, the
organization must make the offender believe that the utility of the information and/or system access is limited. To do
this, the organization might encrypt all PII with very strong encryption (via algorithms the likely offenders are not able
to break) and ―advertise‖ such policies. In sum, decreasing anticipated benefit is a worthwhile approach.
Reducing Justification: Generally, financial fraudsters are seasoned criminals (or criminal organizations), who do not
seek to rationalize their behavior. Their behavior is predatory, and thus does not require internal moral justification,
per se. So, measures to reduce justification are not meaningful.
Reducing Provocation: There is no provocation. MoneyCo.‘s strategy is to stay below the radar, and hence this is not
an issue. Financial fraudsters are not being provoked. So, the issue of reducing provocation does not arise.
Recreational Hacker
Increasing Perceived Effort: Increasing perceived effort required to successfully hack MoneyCo. will increase the
intellectual challenge to the recreational hacker. The increased challenge will motivate many recreational hackers to
continue hacking, rather than dissuade them. Thus, attempts to increase the perceived effort of the ―play‖ hacker will
most likely be counterproductive.
Increasing Perceived Risk: For reasons already stated, the recreational hacker is not likely to perceive the threat of
apprehension and punishment as high, regardless of situational manipulations. The perceived risk of being caught
with respect to incident detection is also inconsequential, because the recreational hacker is not after long-term
information and/or system use. Thus, efforts to increased perceived risk are not applicable in this instance.
Reducing Anticipated Benefit: The primary benefits to the recreational hacker are ego gratification (i.e., to have
bragging rights) and increased knowledge and skill. For this SCP category to be useful in influencing offender
decision making, the organization must make the offender believe that attacking them will not gratify their ego, nor
will it ―teach‖ them anything. We contend that changing this perception will be difficult, thus reducing anticipated
benefits is not a particularly worthwhile approach in this instance.
Reducing Justification: Since play hackers do not plan to misuse any information that they may gain access to, they
often rationalize their behavior as being harmless. Past research has suggested that people often perceive a lesser
ethical problem with activities in cyber space, due to moral distancing issues and a decreased perception of
situational moral intensity in cyber space [Goles et al., 2006]. Thus, situational manipulations that reduce an
offender‘s ability to rationalize the crime as being harmless might prove worthwhile.
Reducing Provocation: The hackers in this category are not being provoked. So, the issue of reducing provocation
does not arise.
In summary, our analysis suggests that increasing the effort, increasing risk, and decreasing anticipated benefit are
approaches to influence the financial fraudsters‘ perception of the crime opportunity, and, reducing justification and
reducing provocation are two approaches to influence the recreational hackers‘ perception of the crime opportunity.
Countermeasure Identification (Step 5c): This discussion does not include countermeasure identification,
because the focus of our research is information security strategy development, not operational level
countermeasure identification.
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APPENDIX 3—CASE 3 ANALYSIS
CASE OVERVIEW
Organization: ―EduISD‖
Organization Type: Moderately-sized, K–12, Independent School District (ISD)
Brief overview of Organization: ―EduISD‖ is a moderately sized independent school district. It serves a combined
user community consisting of 3,000 students (kindergarten through high school), faculty, and staff. In the past, their
only information security concern was system/resource availability. In recent years, their conceptualization of
information security and capability to achieve it has matured to include concerns about access control, information
confidentiality, and data integrity. In particular, they must protect PII, student grades (both from a privacy and
integrity point of view), and student enrollment in social service programs. The Assistant Technology Director (#2 IT
position for the ISD) is responsible for information security and feels that the ISD administration, all the way up to the
Superintendent, places a very high importance on information security. This is contrasted, however, with an
unsupportive user base—the staff, faculty, and students simply do not understand the need for information security
and express concerns that it interferes with their job productivity.
Prior Attacks: To the best of EduISD‘s knowledge, they have not fallen victim to any external attacks by individuals
unconnected with the school. In contrast, they fall victim to insider attacks by students quite frequently. (We define
insider as users with authorization to access all or part of the information technology resources. Students are
allowed access to academic computing, and, hence, can be considered users with authorization to part of the IT
services of the organization.) The attacks have involved changing academic grades, as well as less serious ―play‖
attacks by curious and mischievous students.
Perceived Threats (Step 2a): EduISD perceives two primary threats—grade changers and internal script-kiddies.
Grade Changers: Of the greatest concern to the ISD are high school students who are receiving failing course
grades. They have a high number of incidents, in which students gain unauthorized access to electronic grade books
and change their course grades. Incidents are facilitated largely by lackadaisical faculty and staff members who
leave their computing resources unprotected (i.e., logged in, physically absent, with grade-book applications open).
Such incidents are also accomplished by technically savvy, moderately skilled students who are able to gain
unauthorized access in the more traditional sense (i.e., hacking).
Script-Kiddies: Another insider threat faced by EduISD is the student ―script-kiddie.‖ These students are motivated
by ―play,‖ are relatively unskilled, and are mundane offenders. They are not provoked to attack and are not
necessarily predisposed to continuous criminal activity, but rather seize opportunities to ―see if they can do it‖ and
see if the school will notice. They are motivated by a sense of curiosity and general mischief.
Security Measures: EduISD‘s approach to information security is informal, unstructured, and consists primarily of
technical controls, such as host-based intrusion detection, host-based firewalls, antivirus solutions, and content
filtering. Formal controls are limited to rule-based access controls and acceptable use policies. Informal controls are
limited to brief education and awareness presentations during annual teacher in-service training. They are further
protected by the nature of the state‘s network architecture and infrastructure. The state provides network
connectivity to ISDs through their regional service centers, which are apparently well protected via formal, mature,
and multi-faceted information security programs. In other words, external access to ISD resources is protected not
only by ISD-level information security measures, but also (and first) by regional education service center information
security measures.
CASE ANALYSIS
Other Threats to Consider: It should be recognized that grade changing may be done by a skillful surrogate, i.e.,
most likely, a skillful student who is paid to change the grade of a not-so-skillful student.
Application of the Offender Classification Framework (Step 2b)
Grade Changer: This offender seeks unauthorized access to ISD information systems for the purpose of
compromising the integrity of academic grade information. The student changing his own grade may very well have
a low skill level, whereas the surrogate grade changer might be moderately to highly skilled. In either case, the
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offender is internal to the organization and is provoked by the environmental stress of an impending failing grade
(and monetary incentive in the case of a surrogate grade changer). Based on this reasoning, we characterize this
threat according to the framework as follows:
Offender motivation: Crime
Offender skill: Low to High
Offender-victim relationship: Insider (student)
Crime Involvement: Provoked
Script-kiddie: The script-kiddie is the student seeking unauthorized access to ISD information systems out of
curiosity and mischief. EduISD has not found such threats to be particularly highly skilled. Their behavior is neither
provoked, nor central to their daily life. Instead, it is something fun and interesting to do. Based on this reasoning, we
characterize this threat according to the framework as follows:
Offender motivation: Play
Offender skill: Low to Moderate
Offender-victim relationship: Insider (student)
Crime Involvement: Mundane
Meso-Level Application of SCP (Step 5b): We assessed each of the five factors from SCP for their potential to
help reduce the likelihood of crime by each of the two categories of identified offenders.
Grade Changers
Increasing Perceived Effort: Minimally skilled offenders will likely be dissuaded from the attack, because they will
determine either that success is unlikely or that it is not worth the effort. Some students are failing because of
laziness on their part, thus if grade changing is a difficult task, they will likely not perceive it as an opportunity. It is
currently perceived as an opportunity, because it is so easy to do when faculty are not security-minded and leave
their electronic grade books open and unattended. While it will likely dissuade highly skilled, surrogate gradechangers less, increasing perceived effort required will have some impact. If it appears to require more effort, the
price commanded for the grade-change activity will increase—potentially to the point of deterring the attack.
Increasing Perceived Risk: Risk of being caught has two elements: (1) offender apprehension and punishment, and
(2) incident detection and organizational recovery. Increasing perceived risk of apprehension and punishment will
probably not be very successful in this case, because EduISD has a long history of poorly enforcing rules and very
minimal punishments. Furthermore, the student was failing before the attack anyway, so other punishments (e.g.,
suspension or expulsion) are not likely to be highly influential to this offender. They may be to the surrogate grade
changer, but again punishment is neither certain, nor severe in EduISD.
The risk of incident detection is of much greater consequence in this instance. The presumption is, like in the case of
MoneyCo., that detection limits attack utility. In this case, if the grade change is detected, then a reversal is possible,
thus denying the offender the benefit of the grade change. This is the case with both the grade changer and his
surrogate, thus increasing the perception of the risk of incident detection is a worthwhile approach in this instance.
Reducing Anticipated Benefit: The benefit accruing to the ―failing student‖ (the changed grade) is the primary benefit
of the crime. For this SCP category to be useful in influencing offender decision making, the organization must make
the offender believe that the changed grade will not stand. Once detected, if proper records are available, it is
relatively easy to correct the grades and undo the benefit. One approach is to institute procedures to regularly verify
if the grades have been changed without authorization. Given the importance of the anticipated benefit to the
offender‘s motivation, mechanisms that reduce anticipated benefit should be considered in this instance.
Reducing Justification: EduISD does not believe students who gain unauthorized access to change their grades
rationalize their behavior, at least not in the sense of making it psychologically acceptable behavior. They rationalize
that it‘s better than failing a course, but they do not rationalize that somehow their behavior is excusable. As such,
EduISD does not believe that situational manipulations aimed at removing excuses is called for in this situation.
Reducing Provocation: Normally, reducing provocations would be a very applicable SCP technique to deterring
provoked offenders from committing crimes. However, in this case, the provocation is an environmental stress (a
failing course grade) caused by the student‘s academic performance. While replacing an earned failing grade with a
passing grade would indeed reduce the offender‘s sense of provocation, thereby deterring the offense, it is not an
acceptable solution. Thus, reducing provocation is not applicable in this instance.

Volume 26

Article 17

357

Script-Kiddies
Increasing Perceived Effort: The low-skilled ‗play‘ offender, does not have sufficient technical skills to get past higher
levels of defenses. They are motivated more by mischief, than curiosity, or challenge. Thus, increasing the perceived
effort required will dissuade them from attacking.
Increasing Perceived Risk: For reasons already stated, the script-kiddie is not likely to perceive the threat of
apprehension and punishment as high, regardless of situational manipulations. The perceived risk of being caught
with respect to incident detection is also inconsequential, because the script-kiddie is not after long-term information
and/or system use. Thus, efforts to increased perceived risk are not applicable in this instance.
Decreasing Anticipated Benefit: The benefit to the script-kiddie is the thrill of breaking in. For this SCP category to be
useful in influencing offender decision making, the organization must make the offender believe that successfully
attacking them will not net such a feeling. We contend that changing this perception will be difficult, thus reducing
anticipated benefits is not a particularly worthwhile approach in this instance.
Reducing Justification: Since play hackers do not plan to misuse any information to which they may gain access,
they often rationalize their behavior as being harmless. Past research has suggested that people often perceive a
lesser ethical problem with activities in cyber space, due to moral distancing issues and a decreased perception of
situational moral intensity in cyber space [Goles et al., 2006]. Thus, situational manipulations that reduce an
offender‘s ability to rationalize the crime as being harmless might prove worthwhile.
Reducing Provocation: The hackers in this category are not being provoked. So, the issue of reducing provocation
does not arise.
In summary, our analysis suggests that increasing the effort, increasing risk, and decreasing anticipated benefit are
approaches to influence the grade changers‘ perception of the crime opportunity, and, increasing effort and reducing
justification are two approaches to influence the script kiddie‘s perception of the crime opportunity.
Countermeasure Identification (Step 5c): This discussion does not include countermeasure identification ,
because the focus of our research is information security strategy development, not operational level
countermeasure identification.
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